Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research - Humanitarian Action

The Promise of Social Media in Humanitarian Crises: Community Empowerment and Resilience

Anaïde Nahikian — Thu, 02 Aug 2012 21:11:13 +0000

Blog Type:

IHL in Action

In recent years, events in countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Syria have sparked a flood of research and analysis of social media as a transformative vehicle for “citizen journalism” (for example, see “Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights,” published earlier this year in the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review; “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?”, published in 2011 by the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam; and “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” authored by Malcolm Gladwell and published in 2010 by The New Yorker). However, the potential influence of “citizen journalism” and social media platforms extends beyond political change to humanitarian assistance in disasters and complex emergencies. According to a recent study authored by Mark E. Keim and Eric Noji, the “peer-to-peer” nature of social media engagement can empower affected populations in crises, inform humanitarian agencies of real-time needs, and increase long-term community resilience.

Moreover, the use of information technologies — particularly in the domain of humanitarian assistance for networking, communication, and crisis mapping — has increased greatly in the past few years, generating dynamic exchanges on critical global issues that have significant potential for policy impact.

However, social media becomes even more useful when, as a recent article in IRIN News states, this technology is “used in conjunction with mainstream media (…) to enrich what mainstream media or aid organizations have”. Indeed, “citizen journalists” in the midst of crises are able to contribute real-time testimonies, as do mainstream news sources, but can sometimes also provide beneficial background and details to which mainstream news organizations may not have access. Additionally, through social media, aid agencies are able to engage in a two-way dialogue with communities affected by emergencies, better enabling humanitarian actors to assess the immediate needs of beneficiaries.

The study also indicates that the “peer-to-peer” connections that social media facilitates can empower victims of humanitarian crises to cope more effectively with their circumstances. This empowerment can improve individual and community resilience by offering a sense of control, dignity, and individual as well as community responsibility. Technological innovations, such as adapting social media platforms in local languages to mobile phones through SMS functionality, is also a tremendous asset in crises, particularly when internet access is unreliable.

But despite these advantages, numerous challenges continue to hamper social media use in humanitarian assistance. First, social media remains less widespread and accessible than mainstream media channels. Second, as the study indicates, there is a tendency of public officials to perceive “peer-to-peer” communication networks as “backchannels” with the potential to spread misinformation. Third, social media lacks the regulations present in most mainstream media. The absence of mechanisms to monitor or regulate privacy rights violations is particularly significant, given the personal dimension of events, stories, and circumstances in humanitarian crises. Finally, lost phone signals and sporadic Internet access in complex environments presents an ongoing technical challenge.

These challenges suggest that humanitarian professionals and beneficiaries would benefit from more effectively integrating social media into existing crisis response mechanisms. Additionally, further research into this area could lead to a greater understanding of the long-term impact of social media on community resilience, as well as to a more robust critical analysis of social media’s influence on humanitarian action. While social media has the potential to transform humanitarian assistance in some of the most complex humanitarian environments, the above assessment indicates that the humanitarian community may benefit from a more comprehensive examination of the ways in which social media’s power can be harnessed.

For more on HPCR's recent work on social media and humanitarian protection, click below:
Social Media as a Tool for Humanitarian Protection
ICT and Protection: Can Information and Communication Technology Enhance Humanitarian Action?
Social Media and Humanitarian Protection: Baseline Survey Results by Rob Grace

Blog Tags:

social media

Humanitarian Action

Reasoning with Rebels: the Nitty-Gritty of Engaging Armed Groups

hpcr — Tue, 19 Jun 2012 19:19:51 +0000

Blog Type:

IHL in Action

[Editor's Note: In its efforts to enrich professional dialogue on contemporary challenges of humanitarian law and policy, the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard University, in partnership with ATHA, invites experts in international humanitarian law, humanitarian action, and associated fields to contribute their insights to relevant discussions. We are pleased to welcome the contribution below from Dr. Claudia Hofmann, one of the expert panelists at the 12 June 2012 Humanitarian Action Webcast on Peace Building and Humanitarian Engagement".]

Armed groups have become a more than common feature in today’s conflicts. As of 2010, all active conflicts involve at least one non-state armed actor, if not several, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Yet, the international community still faces severe difficulties in dealing with them.

Naturally, different strategies have been designed to deal with armed groups but none has proven to be the answer to the problem. Instead, a continuum of different actors now apply different strategies in the same place at the same time, causing a number of unintended consequences and creating new problems.

Without better communication and coordination among external actors the situations involving armed groups will not improve.

External actors, such as states, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), command a number of strategies, each tailored to their individual strengths. States, for example, possess enough authority, international standing, and resources - although some more than others - to be capable of combatting, eliminating, deterring, containing, co-opting, and marginalising armed groups in an attempt to fight them (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003). They can also build coalitions with likeminded states to increase their impact and use their reputation and influence to talk armed groups out of or into something (Gaddafi 1976 in the Philippines, Germany setting up talks with the Taliban in 2011).

Within a multilateral institutional setting - such as the EU, UN, NATO or similar - their power increases exponentially if they find enough support among their peers.

On top of that, the institutional setting itself is able to act as an independent personae and create procedures and frameworks that are meant to regulate the behaviour of armed groups (for instance, through the UN Security Council’s recent resolutions for Côte d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and Sudan). International organisations may send special representatives and special envoys to talk to armed groups and mediate or negotiate a settlement, such as the power-sharing agreements in Sudan (2005), Zimbabwe (2008), and Kenya (2008).

And if that was not enough, specialised NGOs now offer mediation between armed groups and their host states as well as mediation support (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center), or attempt to persuade armed groups with arguments that playing nice has its advantages (Geneva Call, International Committee of the Red Cross).

And some of these international approaches have been successful. Say, in Croatia in 1995, states were able to increase the level of security on the ground and (re-)establish a legitimate ruling authority. Of course, many other times states have failed to do so, such as in Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

International organisations have a slightly better track record but they take an enormous amount of time to get going - building a working coalition among states takes time because willing states need to be sure about their stakes in the operation. Moreover, guiding the behaviour of armed groups through frameworks and procedures requires patience. And while NGOs gain advantages with armed groups by means of their non-official status, their reach tends to be limited for much the same reason.

But the actual danger in this continuum of actors and efforts is not so much that some approaches may fail. Failure is a part of life. The actual danger is the simultaneity of the approaches without much communication among the actors.

Picture this: In any given conflict there will be at least two parties to the conflict, possibly more. There will be neighbouring countries that feel the need to help or protect their interests in the region. State actors from outside the region will want to have a say or feel the pressure that, because of their authority, international standing, and resources, they ought to be doing something.

Which brings in international organisations, as the organised expression of the desire to help and the pressure to do something. And then there are usually several hundred humanitarian and development organisations, governmental and non-governmental, that are already on the ground to help.

And all these actors have very different approaches, capabilities, and goals. In this web of activity, armed groups have a walk-over with misusing and instrumentalising what is being offered.

So, while in theory all the different approaches available to the international community may complement each other, with each actor having its own strengths and capabilities that make them superior to other actors in specific settings, the uncoordinated activity on the ground obstructs that. And actors thinking of engaging armed groups should be aware of this. More knowledge about international actors and their approaches to dealing with and engaging armed groups, and more communications among each other may not only achieve a more coordinated and effective approach on the ground. It may also save some actors the effort because another, perhaps more suitable, actor is already on top of the situation. Certainly something to think about.

Blog Tags:

peacebuilding

armed groups

Humanitarian Action

Guest Writer:

Claudia Hofmann

Linking Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding

hpcr — Tue, 12 Jun 2012 13:25:49 +0000

Blog Type:

IHL in Action

Blog Tags:

peacebuilding

Humanitarian Action

Guest Writer:

Masayo Kondo Rossier

International Human Rights and Humanitarian Action

hpcr — Wed, 25 Apr 2012 19:01:31 +0000

Blog Type:

IHL in Action

The question of the degree to which humanitarian actors ought to rely on international human rights law (IHRL), in addition to IHL, is by no means new. It rose to prominence in the humanitarian NGO community in the mid 1990s, and numerous conferences and workshops explored the practical implications for relief work of relying on both human rights and humanitarian principles. The ICRC convened consultations on this issue from 1998 onwards which led to a series of publications and guidelines, including most recently, in 2009, the publication: Professional standards for protection work carried out by humanitarian and human rights actors in armed conflict and other situations of violence.

The fact that the issue continues to present itself, however, and is perceived as “new” or problematic, shows that there is a continuing need for reflection. But in doing so, we should at least proceed on the basis of where previous discussions concluded, or at a minimum be mindful of those conclusions. One key conclusion that has emerged is that the issue is not whether humanitarian actors choose to rely on both IHRL and IHL in their work. Rather, the key issue is whether they understand their work as having a protection component. If they do so, then it is clear that they cannot easily limit their frame of reference to one or other body of law; both will be relevant.

This understanding is explicit in the ICRC definition of protection as encompassing

“…all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law. Human rights and humanitarian organizations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender).”

In other words, an organisation engaged in humanitarian work may eschew a protection aspect to its work (although the wisdom and viability of such a decision will likely be challenged in particular contexts), but accepting that relief work has a protection aspect necessarily entails reference to both IHL and IHRL for standards to guide that work.

The fact that the issue is still presented as if it were one of choosing one or other body of law as a frame of reference, is unfortunate. It is grounded in several misunderstandings, of IHRL in particular, among the humanitarian community. Let us look at three:

1. Confusing tactics with principles

One source of continuing confusion is that many people tend to conflate a particular body of law, IHRL, with particular tactics used to seek its enforcement – namely the very public ‘name and shame’ technique of classic human rights advocacy, with its focus on identifying perpetrators and demanding accountability. Thus, it is too often and too readily assumed that using IHRL as a frame of reference requires public advocacy and, for example, a preference for justice and accountability as opposed to making deals with warlords. This is wrong. Public advocacy is only one technique, albeit a very visible one, for securing respect for human rights; much can be achieved too with quiet persuasion. Many human rights NGOs spend very little time publishing ‘name and shame’ reports; many are wholly occupied in capacity-building work with local communities or, indeed, with governments. Moreover, accountability issues are not particular to IHRL; IHL similarly includes legal demands for accountability including through the prosecution of those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

In short, advocacy and protection strategies should be driven by the capacities and context of particular organisations, not by misguided assumptions of what technique is required by a particular body of law.

2. (Mis)-identifying the duty-holders

Second, there is the confusion that results from assuming that IHRL is ill-suited to identifying obligations on armed groups (or “non-state actors”), and that IHL uniquely creates obligations on both states and armed groups. This is an outmoded understanding. While it is true that core international human rights treaties place obligations on states, some of the more recent protocols to these treaties include armed groups within their scope. Furthermore, the notion of “crimes against humanity”, deeply influenced by human rights norms, now clearly encompasses obligations on both states and armed or otherwise organised political groups, including outside the context of an armed conflict. And finally, in numerous cases, armed groups have signed accords wherein they commit themselves to abide by certain human rights principles – accords that have been sponsored and in some cases monitored by the international community. There is a discernible trend in IHRL to extend obligations to all those wielding power and in a position to impact on human rights.

3. Overlap or inconsistency?

Third, there are confusions that emerge from what are perceived as differing levels of protection offered by the distinct bodies of law, IHL and IHRL. On this point, it should be emphasised that only in a few instances is there an actual conflict between what IHL or IHRL requires vis-a-vis the civilian population. Some of the most notorious examples of recent years arise in the context of the “war on terror” and centre on disputes over the classification of prisoners (of war or not?), and their corresponding due process rights, or over the legality of a policy of targeted assassinations. These are important issues, but they are unlikely to be a prominent feature in the work of most humanitarian organisations.

The much more common scenario is that one body of law is silent. For example, IHL has little to say in terms of the core freedoms civilians enjoy (to assemble, to political participation, to organise, to speech, etc) - freedoms that are essential if relief agencies are serious about holding themselves accountable to beneficiary populations. Similarly, only by inference can IHRL be invoked to establish the rights of humanitarian actors – such action enjoys specific and detailed protection in IHL.

The strategy then should be clear – protection work should draw on both bodies of law, and use the rules best tailored to the specific protection being sought. Where there is inconsistency, a simple solution is to rely on the standard that provides the greater protection – a logical position as the ultimate goal of both IHL and IHRL is to promote human dignity.

Blog Tags:

International Human Rights

Humanitarian Action

Guest Writer:

David Petrasek